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Abstract
Background: Development assistance from governments of high income countries represents the vast majority of
international funding for global health. Recent stagnation of this important source of funding may affect attainment
of major global health goals. The financial crisis is widely accredited as denting governments’ outlay for
development aid, as well as citizen’s support for aid. Europe has also recently experienced record levels of
migration; the so called ‘European migration crisis’. This study aims to analyse trends in public attitudes towards
development aid in European Union (EU) countries, in the context of the European migrant crisis.
Methods: Eurobarometer survey data from 2011 (prior to the migrant crisis) and 2015 (at the peak of the crisis) was
analysed for 27 EU countries. The outcome variables related to people’s levels of support to three statements
around the importance of supporting people in developing countries, increasing countries’ commitments to aid
and willingness to pay extra for products from developing countries. EU Member States were categorised as ‘arrival’
or ‘destination’ countries in view of migration routes and numbers of asylum applications per 100,000 population,
respectively. Multiple linear regression analysis was performed, adjusting for countries’ economic status (gross
domestic product per capita).
Results: In general, support for development aid has increased from 2011 to 2015, but was largely unaffected by
migration status when applying the regression model. In 2015, the belief that development assistance is ‘very
important’ was significantly higher in countries where migrants first arrived compared to other EU Member States,
with a trend towards this association also apparent in 2011.
Conclusions: The positive trends in public support for development aid are encouraging in an age where
economic hardships at home, as well as the tone of national political discourses and rising right wing populism
appear to suggest otherwise.
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Background
Despite the rising influence of civil societies and private
corporations, governments of high income countries still
provide the vast majority of internationally sourced
funding for global health [1]. While this support from
governments, known as Official Development Assistance
for Health (ODA-H), had risen sharply in the first dec-
ade of this century, it has plateaued since 2010 [1]. Fur-
thermore, ODA-H commitments from European Union
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) were substantially lower in 2014 and
2015 compared to previous years [2]. Still, ODA-H
remains a major determinant of global health outcomes,
as it represents a relatively stable source of funding for
major global health programmes. Disease control pro-
grammes, such as malaria control and elimination
interventions, and wider health system strengthening
initiatives in developing countries, may only be ad-
equately supported if the rate of increase returns to
levels observed between 2000 and 2010 [3, 4].
The European Union (EU) and its Member States are
the leading donors of development aid worldwide. They
provided over half the total ODA of OECD DAC
members in 2015 [5]. Health is just one sub-sector of
ODA; still other programmes targeting a range of fields
including education, energy, agriculture and environ-
ment can have a major impact on health [6].
ODA is a long way off from the vision set for OECD
DAC members, which specified a commitment of 0.7%
of their respective gross national incomes (GNI). This
target, set in the 1970s, had been met by just six OECD
countries in 2015: Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom [5].
Several socio-political and economic factors are said to
have further slowed progress towards the 0.7% target in
many OECD countries [7].
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, most EU
donor countries have shown reluctance to increase their
development budgets citing prevailing economic diffi-
culties at home [8]. The amount of money spent on
foreign aid has also become a major feature of the
political discourse in European countries, as most
recently evident in the 2017 general election cam-
paigns in the UK [9]. Development programmes have
been drawn into national debates over the merits of
development aid or the perceived profligacy of the aid
budget [10]. The recent rise of right-wing and
nationalist populism also casts shadow over the
resolve of parliaments across the EU to uphold ODA
commitments [11]. This increased politicisation of
foreign aid in turn renders the exercise of gauging
and describing public opinion on the matter critically
important [12, 13].
Generally, public support for various aspects of Euro-
pean development aid has been found to be consistently
high over the past decades. A survey of 24,999 people in
2004 showed that 91% of European citizens believed
helping people in developing countries to be important
[14]. This figure was 88% in 2009, and 89% in 2010,
thereby showing no sign of denting in the face of the
financial crisis [15, 16]. On the contrary, the proportion
of EU citizens who show strong support for this issue by
indicating their belief that development aid is ‘very im-
portant’ fell from 53% in 2004 to 39% in 2009 (measured
on a scale including the following options: ‘very import-
ant’, ‘fairly important’, ‘not very important’, ‘not at all
important’). Hence, while general support has remained
stable over the years, strong opinions on the matter
(‘very important’) seem to be more sensitive to changing
times. Despite this observation, analysis in most of the
extant literature tends to categorise the ‘very important’
and ‘fairly important’ measures together [17, 18], thereby
potentially obscuring shifting trends in public perspec-
tives towards development aid.
Besides economic hardships caused by the financial
crisis, shifts in public perception may be associated with
the migration crisis that peaked in recent years, espe-
cially in Europe. Surveys deployed as part of the new
2016 European Consensus on Development highlighted
that EU citizens identified the topic of migration as
especially important to address [19]. Worldwide, at the
end of 2015, an unprecedented 65.3 million people were
forcibly displaced from their homes due to violence,
political unrest or violations of human rights [20]. The
number of illegal border crossings into the EU detected
by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Fron-
tex) in 2015 was more than six-times greater than the
already record-high numbers of 2014. The majority of
migrants were displaced individuals from Syria,
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as African countries such
as Eritrea and Somalia [21]. Migrants mainly arrive in
south-eastern EU countries, often lacking sufficient food
and water and requiring medical assistance [22]. Many
continue their journey, aiming to seek asylum and settle
in Western and Central European nations [21]. This
unprecedented flow of migrants began to feature exten-
sively in the news in the summer and autumn of 2015,
and was labelled the ‘European migrant crisis’ [23].
This study aims to describe recent opinions across the
EU on development aid, and analyse the factors that
may be responsible for differences across time and
between countries, comparing the peak year of the mi-
gration crisis (2015) with a preceding year (2011). It is
hypothesised that the migrant crisis may have affected
EU citizens’ attitudes towards development aid, particu-
larly in countries where migrants arrive or attempt to
settle down permanently. Apart from official European
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Commission reports, there is lack of research addressing
recent trends in EU citizens’ opinions on development
aid and any associated factors. This study may fill critical
gaps in that regard.
Methods
Data source
Two primary datasets, obtained by TNS Opinion
(Brussels), were used in the analysis: Special Eurobarom-
eter wave 76.1, conducted in September 2011 (n =
26,856), and wave 84.4 from December 2015 (n = 27,672)
[24, 25]. The Eurobarometer is a series of annual surveys
gauging public opinion on a number of different
socio-political issues, including development aid. A
systematic sampling process, based on administrative
regional units as defined by the European Commission’s
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Level 2
(NUTS 2), was used in each of the 27 EU Member States
(EU27). This process selected participants aged 15 or
above into a representative sample size as per the coun-
tries’ population size and regional population density.
Participants were then interviewed face-to-face at home
in their respective national language. Post-stratification
and population weights were used to ensure representa-
tiveness of the samples.
Other data were drawn from Eurostat, the statistical
office of the EU. For each EU member state, the follow-
ing figures were obtained for 2011 and 2015: total popu-
lation on 1 January, number of asylum applicants, and
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Euros (EUR)
[26–28]. All datasets were de-identified and publicly
available; hence no ethical approval was required.
Measures
The Eurobarometer surveys contained three questions,
identical in 2011 and 2015, which were of interest to this
study. Participants were asked “In your opinion, is it very
important, fairly important, not very important or not at
all important to help people in developing countries?”.
Answer options included ‘very important’, ‘fairly import-
ant’, ‘not very important’, ‘not at all important’ and ‘don’t
know’. In the present study, responses were grouped to
create a binary variable for strong support (‘very import-
ant’ vs. other options) and a variable for general support
(‘very important’ & ‘fairly important’ vs. other options).
The surveys also included the question “The EU (the
European Commission and Member States) has prom-
ised to increase the level of its aid towards developing
countries. Given the current economic situation, which
of the following statements best describes your opin-
ion?”. Response options were ‘we should increase aid to
developing countries beyond what is already promised’,
‘we should keep our promise to increase aid to develop-
ing countries’, ‘we should not increase aid to developing
countries even though it has been promised’, ‘we should
reduce aid to developing countries as we can no longer
afford it’ and ‘don’t know’. This was also recoded into a
binary variable for strong support (‘increase beyond
promise’ vs. other options) and a variable for general
support (‘increase beyond promise’ & ‘keep promise’ vs.
other options).
Participants were also asked “Would you be prepared
to pay more for groceries or products from developing
countries to support people living in these countries (for
instance for fair trade products)?”. Possible answers
included ‘no, you are not ready to pay more’, ‘yes, you
would be ready to pay up to 5% more’, ‘yes, you would be
ready to pay 6 to 10% more’, ‘yes, you would be ready to
pay more than 10% more’ and ‘don’t know’. For this
question, a binary variable to indicate preparedness to pay
any amount for products from developing countries was
created (‘ready to pay more for products’ vs. ‘not ready’).
These binary variables will henceforth be referred to as
‘Development Views’ collectively. Changes between 2011
and 2015 were calculated relative to 2011 values. The
number of asylum applicants was divided by country
population to obtain asylum applicants per 100,000
population. Each country was then classed as ‘arrival’,
‘destination’, or ‘other EU’ country. Arrival countries
were defined as any EU Member State migrants can first
enter via the Eastern Mediterranean or Central Mediter-
ranean routes, as classified by Frontex [21]. These are
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Romania. A
country was classified as Destination if it was amongst
the top ten for asylum applications per 100,000 popula-
tion in 2015 [27]. These were Hungary, Sweden, Austria,
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and Denmark.
Bulgaria and Malta, which qualified for both arrival and
destination status, were classified as arrival only, due to
the relative importance of their status as ports of entry
into the EU and their low position amongst the top ten
countries for asylum applications (tenth and seventh
respectively). All countries not given a status were la-
belled as ‘other EU’. The migration status was added to
the dataset as a categorical variable (‘other EU’; ‘arrival’;
‘destination’). Figure 1 shows the migration status of the
EU27 Member States.
Statistical analysis
Weighted percentages of responses for each of the
assessed Eurobarometer questions were estimated at the
national level using the weights provided in the official
dataset to account for the complex sampling design. An
ecological analysis with member state as the unit of
analysis was conducted. All data and variables were
collated, and multiple linear regression analysis was
performed. For both 2011 and 2015, the Development
Views were chosen as dependent variables (‘very
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important’, ‘increase beyond promise’, ‘pay more’). Inde-
pendent variables included migration status and GDP
per capita (per thousand EUR) of the relevant year. Lin-
ear regression models with percentage change of these
Development Views from 2011 to 2015 as the dependent
variable were also run; migration status and percentage
change in GDP per capita were used as independent
variables. All independent variables were assessed for
statistical significance at p < 0.05.
All statistical analyses were done using STATA Statis-
tical Software, Version 13.1 [29]. Maps were created with
QGIS Geographic Information System, Version 2.18.6.
[30]. Descriptive results are presented as weighted per-
centages. Regression results are shown as beta-coefficients
with 95% confidence intervals (CI).
Results
In the EU27, support for development aid being very
important increased by 10.5%, from 35.9% in 2011 to
39.7% in 2015. The highest proportion of EU citizens
who believe that it is very important to help people in
developing countries in 2011 was found in Cyprus
(74.0%), with a low of 19.7% in Estonia. Sweden (70.4%)
and Latvia (15.7%) were highest and lowest in 2015. The
greatest relative increases from 2011 to 2015 were
found in Romania, Slovenia and Ireland. Citizens of
Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland were least
supportive in 2015 compared to 2011. Table 1
illustrates percentages, and relative change from 2011
to 2015, for all EU countries.
Across the EU27 as a whole, a 32.6% increase in the
percentage of people in favour of seeing EU develop-
ment aid increased beyond what was promised was
observed (12.0% in 2011, 15.9% in 2015). In 2011, levels
of support ranged from 24.5% in Austria to 3.2% in
Bulgaria. Respondents in Bulgaria remained least sup-
portive in 2015 (2.6%), while neighbours Romania were
most supportive (29.1%) – a relative increase of 157.8%
compared to 2011. Other countries with the greatest
increases included Ireland, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta.
Support of increase beyond the EU’s promise declined
the most in Poland, from 14.0% in 2011 to 7.0% in 2015.
Table 2 shows percentages for 2011 and 2015, as well as
the relative change, for all 27 EU Member States. For
levels of general support, see Additional file 1: Table S1.
The EU27 saw a 4.7% relative increase in preparedness
of its citizens to pay more for products from developing
countries to support the people living there, from 47.3%
in 2011 to 49.5% in 2015. In 2011, the greatest support
was found in the Netherlands (79.4%), and the lowest in
Romania (19.4%). In 2015, percentages ranged from
80.3% in Sweden to 15.5% in Bulgaria. Romania
represented the greatest increase (38.0%), while the
biggest declines were seen in Bulgaria (30.3%),
Lithuania, Poland and Greece (25.8%). Figure 2 illus-
trates levels of preparedness to pay more for products
Fig. 1 The 27 EU Member States and their designated Migration Status. The arrows illustrate the two major paths of migration into the EU by
which ‘arrival’ status was determined: The Eastern Mediterranean route (orange) and Central Mediterranean route (blue). The map’s base-layer was
taken from the European Commission’s reference data for countries [47]
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from developing countries in 2011 and 2015 (also see
Additional file 1: Table S2).
In 2011, the percentage of citizens who believed help-
ing people in developing countries to be very important
was on average 10.71 percentage points (pp) (− 0.68 to
22.09) higher in arrival countries compared to other EU
countries, representing a borderline statistically signifi-
cant association. A 1000 EUR rise in GDP per capita
was associated with an increase of 0.56 pp. (0.22 to 0.92)
in support. In 2015, the association between arrival
countries and the ‘very important’ opinion was statisti-
cally significant, with an average of 17.22 pp. (5.39 to
29.05) higher support. A rise in GDP per capita was
again significantly associated with greater support (β =
0.66, 0.32 to 1.00). No significant associations were
found between destination status and the three Develop-
ment Views in any of the models. Table 3 shows
beta-coefficients and p values, with each of the Develop-
ment Views as dependent variables. For sensitivity ana-
lyses with alternative classification of Development
Views, see Additional file 1: Table S3.
Arrival status and GDP per capita were not signifi-
cantly associated with the proportion of respondents
supporting the EU to increase development aid beyond
what is promised in 2011 (arrival: β = 1.06, − 3.39 to
5.50; GDP per capita: β = 0.08, − 0.06 to 0.22). Similarly,
in 2015, the level of support for increasing aid beyond
what was promised was not found to be statistically sig-
nificant with migration status (β = 4.31, − 2.55 to 11.18)
and GDP per capita (β = 0.12, − 0.08 to 0.32).
Compared to other EU countries, citizens of arrival
countries were not prepared to pay significantly more
for products from developing countries in 2011 (β =
1.91, − 12.14 to 8.33) and in 2015 (β = 0.63, − 11.13 to
Table 1 Percentage of each EU country’s population supporting the Development View ‘very important’, 2011 and 2015
Country Opinion ‘very important’, 2011 (%, 95 CI) Opinion ‘very important’, 2015 (%, 95 CI) Change in ‘very important’, 2011–2015 (%)
Austria (AT) 34.7 (31.7–37.7) 38.2 (34.9–41.6) 10.1
Belgium (BE) 36.2 (33.2–39.3) 39.7 (36.6–43.0) 9.8
Bulgaria (BG) 23.3 (20.7–26.1) 25.2 (22.6–28.0) 8.0
Cyprus (CY) 74.0 (70.0–77.6) 66.7 (62.1–71.1) −9.8
Czech Republic (CZ) 24.1 (21.6–26.8) 25.2 (22.5–28.1) 4.5
Denmark (DK) 51.4 (48.1–54.8) 46.5 (43.1–50.0) −9.5
Estonia (EE) 19.7 (17.3–22.5) 17.3 (14.9–20.0) −12.4
Finland (FI) 38.7 (35.4–42.1) 41.2 (37.8–44.6) 6.3
France (FR) 35.3 (32.4–38.4) 35.9 (32.9–38.9) 1.5
Germany (DE) 53.1 (50.2–56.0) 52.7 (49.6–55.7) −0.8
Greece (EL) 30.8 (27.9–33.8) 40.3 (37.0–43.6) 30.8
Hungary (HU) 19.9 (17.4–22.6) 21.4 (18.9–24.3) 7.9
Ireland (IE) 40.8 (37.7–43.9) 58.2 (55.0–61.4) 42.9
Italy (IT) 24.8 (22.2–27.6) 29.5 (26.5–32.8) 19.0
Latvia (LV) 22.7 (20.2–25.5) 15.7 (13.4–18.3) − 30.8
Lithuania (LT) 28.9 (26.2–31.8) 16.8 (14.1–19.9) −41.8
Luxembourg (LU) 59.4 (54.8–63.8) 54.5 (49.4–59.5) −8.2
Malta (MT) 46.3 (41.5–51.3) 62.0 (57.1–66.7) 33.8
Netherlands (NL) 34.2 (30.6–38.0) 45.9 (42.6–49.3) 34.2
Poland (PL) 31.7 (28.8–34.8) 23.8 (21.2–26.7) −24.7
Portugal (PT) 25.8 (23.2–28.5) 27.3 (24.6–30.2) 5.9
Romania (RO) 28.3 (25.6–31.2) 45.9 (42.7–49.2) 62.3
Slovakia (SK) 29.1 (26.1–32.3) 21.4 (18.9–24.2) −26.3
Slovenia (SI) 20.9 (18.4–23.5) 33.4 (30.3–36.6) 60.1
Spain (ES) 36.4 (33.4–39.5) 46.4 (42.9–49.9) 27.5
Sweden (SE) 69.0 (65.7–72.2) 70.4 (66.2–74.3) 2.0
United Kingdom (UK) 34.9 (32.0–37.9) 44.2 (41.1–47.4) 26.6
EU27 35.9 (35.0–36.8) 39.7 (38.7–40.7) 10.5
This table illustrates the percentage of each country’s population of opinion that helping people in developing countries is ‘very important’, 2011 and 2015
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12.38). Association between higher GDP per capita and
willingness to pay more was statistically significant in
2011 (0.81 pp., 0.49 to 1.13) and in 2015 (0.90 pp., 0.56
to 1.24).
Associations between the independent variables and
percentage change of all three Development Views from
2011 to 2015 were non-significant (Table 4). For a sensi-
tivity analysis with alternative classification of Develop-
ment Views, see Additional file 1: Table S4.
Discussion
The present study investigated three aspects of EU
citizens’ attitudes towards development aid. Across these
issues in 2011 and 2015, support was generally highest
in Scandinavia and Western Europe. Lowest percentages
were recorded in some Eastern European nations,
particularly Bulgaria and the Baltic States. In the EU27,
from 2011 to 2015, support for all investigated issues in-
creased. In 2015, the belief that development assistance
is ‘very important’ was significantly higher in countries
where migrants first arrived compared to other EU
Member States, with a trend towards this association
also apparent in 2011.
In describing strong support for helping people in
developing countries (‘very important’), considerable dif-
ferences in opinions were found between countries. This
finding is consistent with previous reports of Euroba-
rometer survey results [15, 16]. The high levels of agree-
ment in Sweden, for example, have been explained with
reference to a collective national feeling or social norm
regarding the importance of supporting the poor in
developing countries, as well as widespread trust in
Table 2 Percentage of each country’s population supporting the Development View ‘increase beyond promise’, 2011 and 2015
Country Opinion ‘increase beyond promise’,
2011 (%, 95 CI)
Opinion ‘increase beyond promise’,
2015 (%, 95 CI)
Change in ‘increase beyond promise’,
2011–2015 (%)
Austria (AT) 24.5 (21.9–27.3) 20.0 (17.3–22.9) −18.5
Belgium (BE) 12.2 (10.3–14.4) 12.7 (10.6–15.1) 4.6
Bulgaria (BG) 3.2 (2.2–4.5) 2.6 (1.8–3.9) −17.1
Cyprus (CY) 7.3 (5.3–9.9) 22.7 (19.0–26.9) 213.4
Czech Republic (CZ) 9.1 (7.5–11.0) 7.3 (5.8–9.2) −19.7
Denmark (DK) 14.1 (12.0–16.6) 14.2 (12.0–16.7) 0.8
Estonia (EE) 5.4 (4.1–7.1) 5.8 (4.4–7.7) 7.6
Finland (FI) 5.4 (4.1–7.2) 5.6 (4.2–7.4) 2.3
France (FR) 12.4 (10.5–14.7) 19.9 (17.5–22.5) 59.8
Germany (DE) 11.8 (10.1–13.7) 16.5 (14.3–18.9) 40.0
Greece (EL) 12.8 (10.8–15.0) 11.3 (9.4–13.6) − 11.3
Hungary (HU) 6.2 (4.9–8.0) 11.7 (9.7–14.0) 86.6
Ireland (IE) 5.8 (4.4–7.5) 18.9 (16.5–21.6) 226.4
Italy (IT) 16.8 (14.5–19.2) 16.2 (13.9–18.9) −3.1
Latvia (LV) 9.7 (8.0–11.7) 8.8 (7.0–10.9) −9.3
Lithuania (LT) 5.0 (3.9–6.5) 4.8 (3.4–6.7) −3.9
Luxembourg (LU) 12.9 (10.2–16.3) 13.1 (10.2–16.8) 1.5
Malta (MT) 7.2 (5.1–10.1) 15.6 (12.4–19.4) 117.1
Netherlands (NL) 8.3 (6.2–10.9) 10.7 (8.8–12.9) 29.0
Poland (PL) 14.0 (11.9–16.4) 7.0 (5.5–8.8) −50.3
Portugal (PT) 8.9 (7.3–10.8) 15.9 (13.7–18.4) 78.8
Romania (RO) 11.3 (9.5–13.4) 29.1 (26.2–32.2) 157.8
Slovakia (SK) 7.8 (6.1–9.9) 6.7 (5.2–8.6) −13.8
Slovenia (SI) 8.2 (6.6–10.0) 19.3 (16.8–22.0) 135.6
Spain (ES) 13.7 (11.7–16.0) 25.6 (22.7–28.8) 87.0
Sweden (SE) 12.7 (10.5–15.2) 12.9 (10.2–16.0) 1.5
United Kingdom (UK) 8.9 (7.2–10.9) 14.2 (12.1–16.5) 59.1
EU27 12.0 (11.4–12.7) 15.9 (15.2–16.7) 32.6
This table illustrates the percentage of each country’s population of opinion that development aid should be ‘increased beyond promise’ of the EU, 2011
and 2015
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governmental institutions spending aid effectively [31].
In contrast, stagnation of economic development in
Latvia and Lithuania [32], may naturally elevate the im-
portance of helping the poor domestically over assisting
those living overseas.
A possible effect of migration was only apparent in
arrival countries, where there was higher support for
helping people in developing countries compared to
other EU countries. This might be because arrival coun-
try citizens are more likely to see migrants in their worst
physical states, due to the ordeals of their journeys [33].
When comparing Italy, which is an arrival country, to
other EU countries, press coverage of migration was
more often focused on humanitarian and migrant health
themes [23]. These include journey-related injuries,
particularly hypothermia-induced problems, as well as
pregnancy related complications due to poor access to
healthcare during the journey and upon arrival in EU
communities [34]. Increased exposure of arrival country
citizens to these issues may be a possible factor explain-
ing higher levels of sympathy.
On the other hand, feelings towards immigration are
generally known to be more negative in Southern Eur-
ope than Western Europe [35]. Therefore, arrival coun-
try citizens may have been more in favour of helping
people in developing countries in the hope this might
stave off the influx of migrants. Whether such thoughts
are valid is debatable because of the complex relation-
ship between development assistance and levels of mi-
gration [36]. Respondents’ views on the other measures
used in the study (increasing promised levels of aid and
spending more on products from developing countries)
are bound to be even more complex, as they are more
likely to be affected by respondents’ level of knowledge,
as well as economic status and political outlooks.
The positive association between GDP per capita and
citizens’ attitudes towards the importance of develop-
ment aid becomes highly interesting in view of varying
results reported in the literature. Several studies have
agreed that income and support for development aid are
positively associated in individual-level analyses [37, 38].
When controlling for individual-level factors though,
Paxton & Knack determined that on the country-level, a
US$1000 increase in GDP per capita of a nation
decreased the probability of its citizens supporting devel-
opment aid by 4% [38]. GDP per capita may be influ-
enced extensively by other variables, which could not be
controlled for in the present study. In any case, it
appears natural to expect that greater proportions of
people in richer countries, owing to purchasing power
differentials, are willing to pay more for products from
developing countries to help the people living there.
Some important limitations of the present study
should be acknowledged. Using survey data implies risk
for selection bias, and face-to-face interviews may
evoke a response bias towards what is socially desir-
able [39, 40]. Furthermore, Eurobarometer surveys do
not question respondents’ knowledge on purpose or
amounts of aid [41, 42]. The public tends to overesti-
mate levels of development assistance, with a third of
UK citizens holding the belief that their government
spent five to 10 % of its GNI on aid in 2011; hence it
is difficult to gauge how this tendency, as well as the
public’s perceptions and knowledge regarding different
types of aid may have impacted results [43]. Studies
of citizens’ perceptions of national level phenomena
Fig. 2 Percentage of citizens prepared to pay more for products from developing countries, 2011 and 2015. The map’s base-layer was taken from
the European Commission’s reference data for countries [47]
Huepers et al. Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:61 Page 7 of 11
Ta
b
le
3
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
of
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Vi
ew
s
w
ith
m
ig
ra
tio
n
st
at
us
an
d
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,2
01
1
an
d
20
15
Ve
ry
im
po
rt
an
t
20
11
Ve
ry
im
po
rt
an
t
20
15
In
cr
ea
se
be
yo
nd
pr
om
is
e
20
11
In
cr
ea
se
be
yo
nd
pr
om
is
e
20
15
Pa
y
m
or
e
20
11
Pa
y
m
or
e
20
15
β
(9
5%
C
I)
p
β
(9
5%
C
I)
p
β
(9
5%
C
I)
p
β
(9
5%
C
I)
p
β
(9
5%
C
I)
p
β
(9
5%
C
I)
p
M
ig
ra
tio
n
st
at
us
O
th
er
EU
co
un
tr
y
(re
fe
re
nt
)
A
rr
iv
al
co
un
tr
y
10
.7
1
(−
0.
68
to
22
.0
9)
0.
06
4
17
.2
2
(5
.3
9
to
29
.0
5)
0.
00
6
1.
06
(−
3.
39
to
5.
50
)
0.
62
8
4.
31
(−
2.
55
to
11
.1
8)
0.
20
6
−
1.
91
(−
12
.1
4
to
8.
33
)
0.
70
4
0.
63
(−
11
.1
3
to
12
.3
8)
0.
91
3
D
es
tin
at
io
n
co
un
tr
y
5.
04
(−
7.
20
to
17
.2
8)
0.
40
3
2.
19
(−
10
.0
4
to
14
.4
2)
0.
71
4
1.
99
(−
2.
79
to
6.
77
)
0.
39
7
−
1.
48
(−
8.
57
to
5.
62
)
0.
67
1
5.
21
(−
5.
80
to
16
.2
2)
0.
33
8
8.
02
(−
4.
13
to
20
.1
7)
0.
18
5
G
D
P/
ca
pi
ta
(p
er
10
00
EU
R)
0.
57
(0
.2
2
to
0.
92
)
0.
00
3
0.
66
(0
.3
2
to
1.
00
)
0.
00
1
0.
08
(−
0.
06
to
0.
22
)
0.
25
2
0.
12
(−
0.
08
to
0.
32
)
0.
22
6
0.
81
(0
.4
9
to
1.
13
)
<
0.
00
1
0.
90
(0
.5
6
to
1.
24
)
<
0.
00
1
Sh
ow
n
fo
r
ea
ch
co
va
ria
te
ar
e
re
gr
es
si
on
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
β,
95
%
C
If
or
β,
an
d
p
va
lu
e
of
st
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e.
β
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
ar
e
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
al
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
ta
bl
e
Huepers et al. Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:61 Page 8 of 11
can be influenced by factors that are external or
indirectly related to people’s experiences of the
phenomenon under study, such as media representa-
tion, nature of political discourse, and the national
mood in general. For example, the national mood in
different countries may still be suffering due to
residual sentiments, and media representations of
these, around the financial crisis; however, these
complex dynamics are difficult to capture in such a
survey [44, 45]. Methodologically, care was taken to
choose arrival countries based on trends reported by
Frontex, and destination countries as per asylum
application statistics provided by Eurostat [27]; other
possible methods of designating migration status
might have given different results.
The present study draws its main strengths from the
consistency of data collection methods across countries
and years. Apart from the Eurobarometer survey results,
all other data used for the analysis were taken from
Eurostat, implying that methods of obtaining this data in
2011 and 2015 were similar. Additionally, the timing of
the surveys was suitable; wave 76.1 in September 2011
reflected attitudes prior to major global increases in
forced displacement, and wave 84.4 from December
2015 captured opinions just months after breaking news
coverage of the European migrant crisis.
Conclusions
Although relationships between recent migratory trends
and opinions on development aid are not straightfor-
ward, policy makers should be encouraged to continue
to tie-in advocacy for development assistance with
migration policies. Careful framing and presentation of
such policies might also improve peoples’ understanding
of how development aid and migration relate. The
general increase in public support for development aid
from 2011 to 2015 should provide impetus for EU insti-
tutions and Member State policy makers to pursue aid
targets towards the 0.7% ODA per GNI mark. At a time
of rising popularity of right-wing nationalism in some
EU countries, this could help emphasise core European
values such as equity and solidarity, which also form the
very foundations of global accords such as the Sustain-
able Development Goals [46]. The consequent natural
net increase in ODA-H spending would be critical for
the pursuit of the major Global Health targets in the
coming decades.
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Table 4 Association of percentage change in Development Views with migration status and percentage change in GDP per capita
in the EU, 2011 to 2015
Percentage change in ‘Very
important’
Percentage change in ‘Increase beyond
promise’
Percentage change in ‘Pay
more’
β (95% CI) P β (95% CI) P β (95% CI) P
Migration status
Other EU country (referent)
Arrival country 21.00 (−6.00 to 48.00) 0.121 45.90 (−27.37 to 119.17) 0.208 7.80 (−10.17 to 25.77) 0.378
Destination country −0.52 (− 25.52 to 24.49) 0.966 − 13.22 (− 81.08 to 54.64) 0.691 10.80 (−5.85 to 27.44) 0.193
Percentage change in
GDP per capita, 2011 to 2015
0.38 (−0.79 to 1.54) 0.509 2.63 (−0.54 to 5.79) 0.099 0.57 (−0.20 to 1.35) 0.141
Shown for each covariate are regression coefficient β, 95% CI for β, and p-value of statistical significance
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